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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze what neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert 
designates by the term ‘chaos’. I argue that using this term Rickert means infinite 
manifolds of human life experiences, that philosophers have to convert into ‘cosmos’ 
of theories by using concept formation. Rickert thinks that cognition orders chaos. I 
show that Rickert’s version of ‘chaos’ is different from the ones that were expressed 
by I. Kant, J. G. Herder, F. W. von Schelling, F. von Schlegel, and F. Nietzsche. I 
also argue that ideas of I. Kant influenced the formation of Rickert’s ideas on chaos.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘chaos’ comes to philosophy from Theogony in which Hesiod narrates that 
Chaos was the first born. When Plato in Symposium and Aristotle in Physics mention 
‘chaos,’ they refer to Hesiod’s poem. Traditionally philosophers interpret chaos as 
something primordial and contrast it with cosmos as the ordered world. One of the 
most interesting versions of this term was elaborated by Heinrich Rickert in the 
twentieth century. 
In his Die Philosophie des Lebens Rickert claims that chaos exists. He also 
claims that chaos can be converted into cosmos. Given these claims, one might 
expect that when confronted with the question of what chaos is, he would adopt one 
of the three versions of ideas on chaos that were argued previously by German 
philosophers. First, Kant held in works of his “precritical period” that chaos was a 
pre-cosmic state in the evolution of the universe (e.g. Kant, 1755, p. 78). Second, 
German Romantics used the term ‘chaos’ when they wrote about ancient mythology 
and the first attempts of philosophers to grasp the absolute (e.g. Schlegel, 1982, p. 
154). Third, Friedrich Nietzsche described chaos as “the zero degree of Being” 
(Haar, 1998, p. 82). But these three interpretations are not what Rickert writes. He 
writes, rather, that chaos consists of infinite manifolds of our experiences of the 
world and life.   
 
Literature review 
 
Rickert’s ideas about chaos have usually remained unnoticed. The majority of 
interest in Rickert has revolved around his theories on values (e.g. Krijnen, 2001; 
Oaks, 1988), cultural sciences (e.g. Bohlken, 2002), social concepts (e.g. Dewalque, 
2016), the status of philosophy (e.g. Staiti, 2015), issues of ethics (e.g. Centi, 2015), 
and religion (e.g. Crowe, 2010). Only in a few papers do researchers (e.g. Zijderveld, 
2006) pay some attention to Rickert’s ideas on chaos. I have not found any that 
focused on this issue. This is unsurprising for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, applying the term ‘chaos’ has no comparison among neo-Kantian 
thinkers. Philosophers of Marburg neo-Kantianism, Rickert’s colleagues in 
Heidelberg neo-Kantianism, representatives of other groups of neo-Kantians, as well 
as researchers of neo-Kantianism do not address chaos. Secondly, Rickert used the 
term ‘chaos’ extensively in only one of his important writings, Die Philosophie des 
Lebens. Customarily this book does not arouse researchers’ interest as much as his 
other writings: it has not even been translated into English. There are two books in 
English of translations of Heinrich Rickert’s writings now: Science and  History: a 
Critique of Positivist Epistemology (1962) and The Limits of Concept Formation in 
Natural Science: A Logical Introduction to the Historical Sciences (1986). Neither 
contains a translation of Die Philosophie des Lebens. Thirdly, the influence of 
Rickert’s ideas about chaos on other philosophers is undiscovered. Researchers 
rightfully argue that Rickert exercised a profound influence on generations of 
theorists in a host of disciplines, namely on Martin Heidegger, Max Weber, Georg 
Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch and others (e.g. Crowe, 2010, p. 617). But Rickert certainly 
influenced these thinkers with his more famous concepts, not with his ideas about 
chaos. 
The appearance of the term ‘chaos’ in Rickert’s philosophy is puzzling. 
Rickert does not use the word ‘chaos’ at all in the majority of his writings. But in Die 
Philosophie des Lebens he suddenly uses ‘Chaos’ 13 times (Rickert, 1922, p. 14, 16, 
53, 148, 149, 172, 181, and 182), the term ‘Lebenschaos’ [chaos of life] 3 times 
(Rickert, 1922, p. 45, 140, and 182), ‘Weltchaos’ [world chaos] and ‘chaotisch’ 
[chaotic] twice each (Rickert, 1922, p. 14, 45, 46, and 181), and the word 
‘Wertchaos’ [chaos of values] once (Rickert, 1922, p. 140). 
 
The Purpose of the Research 
 
The question provoked by the appearance of the term ‘chaos’ in Rickert’s 
philosophy and by the originality of his version of chaos is as follows: what exactly 
does Rickert mean when he claims that there is chaos? To answer this question, it 
will be helpful to analyze Rickert’s ideas on chaos in the context of his 
epistemological theories. It will also be useful to compare his ideas about chaos with 
the ideas of other German philosophers who wrote about chaos, namely Immanuel 
Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling, Friedrich von 
Schlegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche.  
 
2. Chaos and Rickert’s Theory of Concept Formation 
 
In the writings of neo-Kantians, as Christian Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler have 
convincingly argued, “philosophy is not reduced to epistemology, but epistemology 
functions as the philosophia prima” (Krijnen and Zeidler, 2012, p. 232). Rickert’s 
ideas on chaos are no exception. He uses the term ‘chaos’ when he examines 
epistemological issues. For instance, he writes the following: “For a man of theory, 
free from any extrascientific [außerwissenschaftlichen] evaluations, at the beginning 
of investigation, that is regardless of any understanding, the world appears not as a 
world in the meaning of cosmos, an ordered whole, but as chaos, depiction of which 
is practically impossible, and as we have seen, it is useless in a theoretical sense, 
because it would lose cognitive importance, even if we were able to do it” (Rickert, 
1922, p. 148, my translation). 
Rickert stresses that philosophy has only one tool for understanding the world. 
This tool is concepts. He believes the aim of philosophy is to possess the world by 
concepts, organize and unambiguously define it. In Die Philosophie des Lebens he 
uses the metaphor of building a house out of bricks when he wants to illustrate a 
process of creating theories. He writes that a man has to build the house, has to live 
in it, and has to watch the world from this house. According to Rickert, if a theory is 
a house, it must be built by sound building blocks, that is, by concepts. We can not 
use sensations as building blocks, because such material is poorly adapted for 
creating a theory. Rickert believes that our experiences of the world are chaos. 
Before building a theory we have to do some pre-construction activities, that is, 
concept formation. The chaos of experience is only a raw material of concept 
formation. We should form building blocks from parts of this chaos. 
 Rickert defines a concept as a combination of essential parts of reality. He 
argues that a concept does not reflect all parts of given reality, only some of these 
parts, although they are essential ones. Rickert regards cognition as a transformation, 
not as a literal reflection of an external world. In the process of cognition using 
concepts, we designate essential relationships, separating them from non-essential 
ones. We dismember and order the chaos of the infinite manifolds of our experiences 
by this process of designating. Developing Windelband’s distinction between 
nomothetic and idiographic judgments, Rickert points out that there are two ways of 
grasping reality: generalizing [generalisierende Auffassung] and individualizing 
[individualisierende Auffassung]. Both help us to order ‘chaos’, creating ‘cosmos.’ 
It is important that Rickert uses the term ‘chaos’ in his Die Philosophie des 
Lebens, in which he criticizes thinkers of Lebensphilosophie [philosophy of life] 
such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Simmel, and Wilhelm Dilthey. Against these 
philosophers he contends that they reject the idea of a clear distinction between form 
and content when they do not see a distinction between cosmos and chaos. Rickert 
argues that thinkers of Lebensphilosophie are mistaken when they assert that life is 
both cosmos and chaos. He emphasizes that these are different things. Rickert writes 
the following: “The scientific work of philosophy loses any meaning if it is 
impossible to work out cosmos by means of theories from the chaos of experiences” 
(Rickert, 1922, p.172, my translation) 
  Rickert’s theories raise a puzzling question: when he writes about chaos does 
he mean chaos of transcendent objects or chaos of immanent ones? Dutch researcher 
Anton Zijderveld has argued that Rickert means both: “Rickert believes that the 
concepts of his transcendental philosophy ought to remain empty forms which 
allegedly mold chaotic and irrational contents (the transcendent and immanent 
realities) into a rationally understandable cosmos” (Zijderveld, 2006, p. 87). But it is 
clear that transcendent things can acquire the status of reality for us only after they 
have been experienced by us. In other words, transcendent things can become a 
reality for us only as immanent things. I think that when Rickert writes about chaos 
he means only the chaos of human experiences, only immanent reality. 
To understand Rickert’s ideas about chaos it is necessary to analyze his 
conception of philosophy. Rickert characterizes true philosophy as a reasoning of 
values and also as a science of a whole.  
Rickert believes that philosophy discovers general principles through 
investigating values. Philosophy begins, he holds, where problems of values begin. 
Oakes and other researchers have pointed out important influences of this theory on 
a lot of thinkers of the twentieth century (e.g. Oakes, 1990). Rickert stresses that 
philosophy has to seek values and systematically order them. This ordering must 
have general principles. For example, when philosophy orders life, it has to give a 
whole interpretation of the meaning of life. Anton Zijderveld has given one such 
explanation of Rickert’s idea about using awareness of values in the process of 
ordering chaos: “Only he who, or that which is related to values, can logically be 
singled out from the irrational chaos of facts, objects, and living beings as individual, 
particular, unique” (Zijderveld, 2006, p. 178). 
Rickert, like other representatives of neo-Kantianism, believes that philosophy 
has to be a science. Of course, he assumes that philosophy cannot be an ordinary 
science: it must be oriented toward the world as a whole, and not merely toward this 
or that specific part of it. Concepts of other sciences represent only separate parts of 
the world, but philosophy is a conceptual construction that can explain the world as a 
whole. This task can be performed only by philosophy as a system. He believes that 
concepts in philosophy have to be a system. According to Rickert, successful 
dismembering of the chaos of experience is possible only by a system of concepts. 
He emphasizes: “Only the system enables converting world chaos [Weltchaos] into 
world cosmos [Weltkosmos], so we can say that any philosophy has to have the form 
of the system” (Rickert, 1922, p. 14, my translation).  
That is, if philosophy wants to be a science about a whole, it has to build a 
whole ordered system of its concepts. Singular concepts designate only singular 
parts of life, not life as a whole. In order to grasp the world as a whole, philosophers 
ought to use a form. And a system of concepts has to be this form. It is important to 
be aware of the fact that Rickert gives great importance to using a system in 
philosophy. Beatrice Centi has correctly stressed that “Rickert’s system is not merely 
an ordering procedure, but rather the instrument, through which philosophy unearths 
what is fundamental” (Centi, 2015, p. 139). 
Rickert points out that dismembering and ordering the chaos of the world have 
significant utility for people. They give us the possibility of being oriented in this 
reality. Rickert agrees with thinkers of Lebensphilosophie that life is inherently 
elusive and obscure. He describes our experiences of life as volatile manifolds of 
sensations that appear in an infinite number of combinations. But he claims that a 
philosopher can grasp the world as a whole using theories. Rickert contradicts 
philosophers of Lebensphilosophie in saying that a theoretically oriented man is able 
to reflect upon the world in its totality. He compares life to a sea and says that we 
need a compass or guiding lights to philosophize about life. Ordering chaos by 
concepts with our intellect gives us such a compass and guiding lights. I agree with 
the opinion of A. Staiti that “Rickert is arguing that the intellect is the organ of 
freedom, that freedom which alone allows our thoughts to soar over the daily 
concerns and chores of our existence” (Staiti, 2015, p. 31).  
Even more, Rickert believes that a man who orders chaos gains mastery over 
life. One subdues the chaos of his experiences and this activity enables him to set 
about systematic ordering of the world. Rickert concludes that our cognition of the 
world aims to master the world in concepts. 
At the same time, it is important to say that Rickert’s version of chaos is not as 
profound in the areas of ethics and metaphysics as some modern researchers would 
want it to be. For example, Tano S. Posteraro has raised a good question: “What does 
it mean for philosophy to take seriously the chaos that haunts and threatens to 
undermine the fleetingly static formations that populate our epistemological 
landscapes?” (Posteraro, 2015, p. 455). Rickert does not analyze such questions. By 
using the term ‘chaos’ he does not repudiate the theories traditional in German 
idealism. He does not believe that the world is murky, inevitable chaos. He develops 
Kantianism, though he does it with his original ideas and theories. Another deep 
issue was posed by Martine Hollins: “How is a personal life to be lived when there is 
knowledge of chaos?” (Hollins, 1996, p. 29). Hollins states that it is impossible for a 
person to live in constant awareness of chaos. But Heinrich Rickert does not think 
that awareness of chaos is a problem. He uses the term ‘chaos’ to designate a variety 
of experiences. And he does not think that awareness of the chaotic state of these 
experiences threatens a person. He offers a way of ordering chaos and describes 
dismembering it as a clear procedure for doing this.  
 
3. Rickert and Kant on Chaos 
 
The primordial meaning of ‘chaos’ used by traditional philosophers is also used by 
Immanuel Kant, in the writings of his precritical period when he wants to designate 
an unformed state of nature.  
As is well-known, Kant’s earlier writings are primarily contributions to natural 
philosophy and his interest in cosmogony is one of his earliest. Kant describes the 
evolution of nature as a cyclical process, including the formation of new worlds and 
the decline of old ones. According to Kant’s account, chaos is the raw material of the 
dispersed elements. Nature forms new worlds out of this chaos. Kant considers chaos 
to be not only the raw material of world formation but also the result of how long 
worlds have existed. In Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels Kant 
writes about the decay and destruction of worlds that finally buries all the worlds that 
have completed their term in one total state of chaos. The process of world formation 
starts out of this raw material again. Kant stresses that chaos plays an important role 
in the rejuvenation of decayed nature. The raw state contains the seed of future 
worlds that strive to evolve out of it. Kant believes that creation is never complete; it 
will never stop.   
Kant also uses the term ‘chaos’ when he analyzes the process of Earth 
formation. In his early works he argues that in the beginning the Earth was a wholly 
liquid mass, a ‘chaos’ in which all the elements, air, water, etc. were commingled. 
For example, in his Die Frage, ob die Erde Veralte, Physikalisch Erwogen he 
assumes that the separation of the elements and the air that are intermingled in the 
“general chaos” [gemeinen Chaos] is not achieved very rapidly (Kant, 1839, p. 8). It 
is clear that Kant uses the term ‘chaos’ to designate unformed nature.  
Kant believes that the formation process does not need human assistance: 
nature evolves from chaos to cosmos not by human efforts. Kant argues in 
Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels that “Even in chaos, nature is 
productive [fruchtbar]” (Kant, 1755, p. 78, my translation). 
In contrast, formation from chaos to cosmos, according to Rickert, is a human 
business. He stresses that one creates cosmos from chaos. However by chaos Rickert 
certainly means something different from Kant’s version. Rickert and Kant agree 
that chaos is the unformed state and that cosmos is the formed state. Further, they 
agree that chaos can be converted into cosmos. But Rickert refuses to designate 
nature as the place and substance of such formation. He holds that this formation 
takes place in human consciousness. When Rickert writes about chaos he does not 
describe the primal state of the universe or a planet. He means the difficulty in 
cognition of ordering infinite manifolds of experiences.  
Immanuel Kant often uses the term ‘chaos’ in his precritical period, but he 
almost never uses this term when he begins to examine the capacities and limitations 
of reason. For example, in his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels 
Kant used the term ‘chaos’ 22 times, but in his Critik der Reinen Vernunft it is used 
only once in the preface. When Kant uses the term ‘chaos’ he describes processes in 
the realm of matter, not in the realm of judgments and reason. Of course, neo-
Kantians are concerned with theories from Kant’s Critiques and cannot use Kant’s 
term ‘chaos’ in its “precritical” sense. Rickert took Kant’s term from books of the 
precritical period, but he interprets it in the spirit of Kant’s theories of the period of 
the Critiques. As Daniel Smyth has argued, a distinction between sensibility and 
understanding is the keystone of Kant’s critical enterprise (Smyth, 2014, p. 551). 
Rickert continues this tradition when he writes that our senses produce a chaos of 
experiences that can be converted into a cosmos by means of understanding. 
What causes me to think that, in Die Philosophie des Lebens, Rickert develops 
the term ‘chaos’ of early Kant? At first glance, he could have taken this term from 
books by Nietzsche. To answer this question I should note that when Rickert uses the 
term ‘chaos’ he does so while also applying another term, ‘cosmos.’ Using this pair 
of terms is the feature of Kant’s early works. In the writings of Kant’s precritical 
period, he uses the system of two notions, namely ‘chaos’ and ‘cosmos’, to explain 
the processes of formation of unformed things. I think that it is not a coincidence that 
Rickert does the same. Nietzsche usually does not use the term ‘cosmos’ to designate 
the opposite of chaos. He uses metaphoric expressions for this purpose. For instance, 
Nietzsche discusses tanzende Stern [a dancing star] (Nietzsche, 1954a). Moreover, as 
is well-known, Rickert regarded Kant as a model philosopher and criticized 
Nietzsche. Of course, Rickert would prefer to develop the notions of the first, not the 
latter. Drawing on this, I argue that Rickert develops the term ‘chaos’ of early Kant, 
not of Nietzsche.       
  
4. Rickert and Romantic Philosophers on Chaos 
 
Romantic philosophers addressing the unmeasurable and the infinite cannot pass 
over the theme of chaos in silence. I will compare Rickert’s version of chaos with 
those of three German Romantics, namely Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich 
Wilhelm von Schelling, and Friedrich von Schlegel. 
Johann Gottfried Herder in his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der 
Menschheit describes the idea that the beginning of all things was a dark and 
troubled chaos without limits or form. He believes that this idea belongs to a 
mythology that is very ancient, and common to different nations. However Rickert 
does not support the Romantics’ interest in mythology. Neither cosmogony nor 
mythology are close to Rickert’s ideas on chaos.  
But another passage by Herder is more interesting to compare with Rickert’s 
ideas. Herder writes the following: “In the chaos of beings, which the senses point 
out to him, he has sought and discovered unity and intelligence, order and beauty” 
(Herder, 1996, p. 136). Herder used the words “Chaos der Wesen” [chaos of beings] 
in this passage (Herder, 1965, p. 110). This passage seems to be close to the 
epistemological views of Rickert. He stresses that our experiences of life appear as 
chaos, as I have said. Nonetheless in the passage above, Herder does not write about 
concept formation. He writes about perception of external objects by a “soul.” From 
the chaos of things a soul calls forth a figure, on which it fixes its attention. Rickert’s 
theory about dismembering and ordering chaos by concept formation is far from 
Herder’s ideas.  
Another Romantic philosopher, Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling, defines 
chaos as pure formlessness. But he does not think that chaos is simply a void. 
Schelling interprets this formlessness as the bounteous and inexhaustible source of 
forms. In his Philosophie der Kunst Schelling writes the following: “The inner 
essence of the absolute, that in which all resides as one and one as all, is primal 
chaos itself.31 (Schelling, 2008, p. 88). Schelling used the words “ursprüngliche 
Chaos selbst” [primal chaos itself] in this passage (Schelling, 1859, p. 465). Of 
course, Heinrich Rickert does not mean primal chaos in his theories. He discusses 
chaos when he analyses contemporary life, not prehistoric times.  
Arguably it would be more productive to compare Rickert’s ideas about chaos 
with another passage by Schelling. Schelling holds that when ancient thinkers coined 
the concept ‘chaos,’ it was the first attempt to grasp the absolute. That is, ‘chaos’ as 
a philosophical concept is the first attempt of philosophers to see a whole. Rickert 
writes that conceptual construction enables a man to see life as a whole, as I have 
mentioned above. But Rickert does not discuss the concept ‘chaos’ as something 
unique. Schelling insists that inventing the term ‘chaos’ to describe the absolute was 
the starting point for philosophy. However Rickert believes that only a system of 
concepts can represent the world as a whole. Any single concept, for example the 
concept ‘chaos,’ cannot address the challenge adequately. 
Moreover, researchers claim that “Schelling means the chaos that is beyond or 
indifferent to the difference between chaos and order” (Schuback, 2005, p. 75).  
Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback argues that Schelling’s ‘chaos’ is not a place before 
the order of places but the inconceivably placeless force of an eternal beginning. 
Rickert’s and Schelling’s versions of chaos are certainly different.  
Another Romantic, Friedrich von Schlegel, in his Über das Studium der 
Griechischen Poesie gives the following description of ways of converting original 
chaos to cosmos. He writes that original “old chaos” [alten Chaos], according to 
legend, “awaited a love [Liebe] and a hatred [Haß] in order to separate the different 
parts and to unify the similar ones” (Schlegel, 1982, p. 154, my translation). The 
process of converting chaos into cosmos was described by Rickert similarly. He 
wrote that concepts dismember and order chaos. But Rickert definitely is not 
concerned with the original chaos of Romantic cosmogonies and ancient legends, or 
poetic metaphors of love and hatred. 
Drawing on the results of this comparison, I argue that Rickert does not 
develop the German Romantics’ ideas on chaos; he develops Kant’s version of the 
term ‘chaos,’ as I have said. 
  
5. Rickert and Nietzsche on Chaos 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche often uses the term ‘chaos’ in his writings. For instance, in Die 
Fröhliche Wissenschaft he claims that “The total character of the world, however, is 
in all eternity chaos – in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, 
arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our 
aesthetic anthropomorphisms (Nietzsche, 2006c, p. 219). Nietzsche used the words 
“alle Ewigkeit Chaos” [all eternity chaos] in this passage (Nietzsche, 1906, 174). 
 In his Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben, Nietzsche uses the 
term ‘chaos’ when he discusses the formation of Greek culture. He states that the 
Greeks for many years lived in “a chaos of foreign – Semitic, Babylonian, Lydian, 
and Egyptian – forms and concepts” (Nietzsche, 2006b, p. 140). Nietzsche used the 
words “ein Chaos von ausländischen” [a chaos of foreign] in this passage 
(Nietzsche, 1954c, p. 283). Nietzsche stresses that Hellenic culture could have 
become an aggregate, but it did not. He argues that the Greeks gradually learned how 
to organize [organisieren] this chaos by concentrating on their genuine needs, and by 
letting the pseudoneeds die out. As a result of organizing the chaos of forms and 
concepts of various peoples of the entire Orient, the Greeks increased that inherited 
treasure of Oriental ideas. Nietzsche claims that the Greeks, by organizing this 
chaos, became the first cultured people. 
Nietzsche assumes that the Greek example of organizing chaos is a parable for 
individuals, for “each of us”. He believes that one “has to organize the chaos within 
him by concentrating [zurückbesinnen] on his genuine needs” (Nietzsche, 1954c, p. 
283, my translation.) 
In Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Nietzsche claims that one can order his chaos. 
He emphasizes that creature and creator are united in a human being: “the human 
being is matter, fragment, excess, clay, filth, nonsense, chaos; but the human being is 
also a creator, sculptor, hammer-hardness, observer-divinity, and the Seventh Day” 
(Nietzsche, 2006a, p. 348). Nietzsche used the words “Unsinn, Chaos” [nonsense, 
chaos] in this passage (Nietzsche, 1954b, p. 688). Describing the process of ordering 
this chaos, Nietzsche stresses that the “creature in the human being” [Geschöpf im 
Menschen] “must be formed, broken, forged, torn, burned, annealed, purified” 
(Nietzsche, 2006a, p. 348). 
Nietzsche regards chaos as necessary to develop a person. He states this 
clearly in the famous phrase: “I tell you: one must have chaos in one, to give birth to 
a dancing star. I tell you: you still have chaos in you. Alas! The time is coming when 
man will give birth to no more stars. (Nietzsche, 2006d, p. 258). Nietzsche used the 
words “Chaos in sich” [chaos in you] in this passage (Nietzsche, 1954a, p. 283). 
Although Rickert criticizes Nietzsche, their ideas about chaos seem similar. 
Neither describes ordering chaos as a process of nature. They agree that a person can 
perform this process. However there are essential differences in their interpretations 
of chaos. Michael Haar has convincingly argued that Nietzsche regards chaos as “the 
zero degree of Being” (Haar, 1998, p. 82). Similarly, I argue that Rickert interprets 
chaos as the zero degree of cognition. 
Rickert writes that we cannot achieve tanzende Stern without conceptual 
construction: “Without mastering the chaos of life [des Lebenschaos] with concepts, 
we will not come to any star not to mention cosmos” (Rickert, 1922, p. 182, my 
translation). Nietzsche does not write about conceptual construction or other 
epistemological issues of the process of cognition. He is concerned with the 
transvaluation of all values and the will to power. This is very far from Rickert’s idea 
about ordering chaos to get a true picture of life as a whole. 
However, I think that Nietzsche’s writings played a certain role in forming 
Rickert’s ideas about chaos. It is interesting that Rickert does not use the term 
‘chaos’ in the overwhelming majority of his important articles and books on 
epistemological issues. For example, Rickert absolutely did not use this term in 
Fichtes Atheismusstreit und die Kantische Philosophie: Eine Säkularbetrachtung, 
Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbilding: Eine Logische Einleitung 
in die Historischen Wissenschaften, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft: Ein 
Vortrag, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: Einführung in die 
Transzendentalphilosophie, or Zur Lehre von der Definition. But Rickert actively 
uses ‘chaos’ in his Die Philosophie des Lebens, in which he criticizes the thoughts of 
philosophers of Lebensphilosophie, especially Nietzsche. Arguably Rickert decided 
to give his own “correct” interpretation of the term that was important for Nietzsche, 
as well as give his own interpretation of the term “philosophy of life.” Nietzsche’s 
ideas occasioned Rickert’s articulation of his own understanding of meaning of 
‘chaos.’ 
Nietzsche’s interpretation of chaos does not provide a strong distinction 
between content and form. But this distinction was important to the philosophy of 
Kant, whose theories were the ideal for neo-Kantian Rickert. I agree with Anton 
Zijderveld, when he calls Rickert “a loyal follower of the great philosopher of 
Königsberg” in the ongoing discussion of the distinction between form and content 
(Zijderveld, 2006, p. 21). In his philosophy, Kant used various pairs of terms to 
designate a distinction between content and form. One of these pairs is ‘chaos’ and 
‘cosmos,’ which he used during his precritical period. When Rickert criticized the 
ideas of thinkers of Lebensphilosophie in Die Philosophie des Lebens, he used this 
pair of Kant’s notions to articulate his opinion, correcting Nietzsche’s understanding 
of chaos. However, Rickert also had to modify Kant’s early version of the distinction 
between content and form. He rejects all “precritical” features of this version. 
Rickert refuses to see cosmogonical connotations in the term ‘chaos’. Also, 
according to Rickert, this kind of chaos can be ordered into cosmos not by nature but 
by a human by means of his consciousness.  
6. Conclusion 
 
As I have shown, a lot of German philosophers used the term ‘chaos,’ namely 
Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling, 
Friedrich von Schlegel, Friedrich Nietzsche etc. But Rickert’s version of this term is 
original because he gave it the meaning that corresponds to his own epistemological 
system. 
Rickert and early Kant agree that chaos is an unformed state and that cosmos 
is a formed state. They agree, further, that chaos can be converted into cosmos. But 
Rickert refuses to discuss nature as the place and substance of this formation. He 
holds that this formation takes place in consciousness. When Rickert writes about 
chaos he does not designate a primal state of the universe or a planet as Kant did in 
his early writings. For Rickert chaos is a raw material that consciousness uses to 
create a cosmos of theories by means of human reflection. According to Rickert, 
chaos can be ordered into cosmos not by nature, as early Kant thought, but by a 
philosopher. Rickert develops Kant’s term ‘chaos’ from the works of his precritical 
period, and interprets this term in the spirit of Kant’s theories of the period of the 
Critiques with his own developments. 
I have shown that the use of ‘chaos’ by some German Romantic philosophers 
is close to Rickert’s use of the term. Johann Gottfried Herder applies ‘chaos’ when 
he writes about perception of external objects by a “soul.” Friedrich Wilhelm von 
Schelling interprets the formlessness of chaos as the bounteous and inexhaustible 
source of forms. Friedrich von Schlegel uses the term ‘chaos’ when he describes the 
process of converting primal chaos into cosmos. But the German Romantics do not 
use this term to designate the process of concept formation as Rickert does. Further, 
Rickert does not address the initial chaos of cosmogonies and ancient legends, in 
contrast to the Romanics. However the process of converting chaos into cosmos was 
described similarly by Rickert and some Romantic philosophers. For instance, 
Heinrich Rickert and Friedrich von Schlegel both hold that chaos has to be ordered 
by means of dismembering.  
Although Rickert criticizes Friedrich Nietzsche, their ideas on chaos seem to 
have some similar, important features. Rickert and Nietzsche do not describe the 
process of ordering chaos as one of the processes of nature. They both claim that a 
human being can perform this process. However, Nietzsche does not address 
conceptual construction. Yet, Nietzsche’s writings played a role in forming Rickert’s 
ideas on chaos. In Die Philosophie des Lebens Rickert gives his own interpretation 
of this term that was important for Nietzsche. In light of the background of the term 
‘chaos,’ Rickert’s interpretation becomes deep and interesting for understanding the 
processes of human cognition. 
It would be reasonable to continue the analysis of Rickert’s ideas about chaos 
by exploring the issue of the influence of these ideas on other philosophers. I will do 
it in other articles.  
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Анотація  
Кулик О.В. Хаос в філософії Генріха Риккерта.  В даній статті 
проаналізовано зміст, який вкладав представник неокантіанства Генріх 
Риккерт в термін «хаос». Як було показано, цей філософ позначав терміном 
«хаос» нескінченне різноманіття життєвого досвіду людини, яке філософи 
мають перетворювати  на «космос» теорій. Риккерт вважав, що в процесі 
пізнання людина впорядковує хаос. В статті аргументовано, що 
інтерпретація змісту поняття «хаос», яку запропонував Г. Риккерт, 
відрізняється від тлумачень даного терміну, які використовували інші 
представники німецької філософії - І. Кант, Й. Гердер, Ф. Шеллінг, Ф. Шлегель 
та Ф. Ніцше. Також було показано, що ідеї І. Канта вплинули на формування 
уявлень Риккерта щодо хаосу. Як було продемонстровано в статті, Генріх 
Риккерт використовує термін «хаос» у своїх гносеологічних теоріях, що 
осмислюють процес пізнання. Риккерт стверджує, що хаос - це те, з чого 
філософ може формувати поняття для розуміння світу. Створюючи поняття 
як складові елементи теорій, людина впорядковує хаос, розчленовуючи його, 
маркуючи сутнісні зв’язки. На переконання Риккерта, такі способи наукового 
осмислення дійсності, як узагальнення та індивідуалізація, допомагають нам 
розчленувати та упорядкувати «хаос» нашого досвіду, створюючи «космос» 
теорій.  Риккерт переконаний, що лише система понять здатна перетворити 
хаос на космос. Адже, поняття, які не входять до системи, не можуть 
репрезентувати світ у цілому. Крім того, було показано важливість думки Г. 
Риккерта  про те, що впорядкування хаосу є корисним для людини. Риккерт 
вказує, що завдяки впорядкуванню хаосу людина здатна орієнтуватися в 
реальності та стверджувати себе в ній.   
 
Ключові слова 
Риккерт, хаос, формування понять, неокантіанство, пізнання, німецький 
ідеалізм, епістемологія. 
 
Аннотация 
Кулик А.В. Хаос в философии Генриха Риккерта. В данной статье 
проанализировано содержание, которое вкладывал представитель 
неокантианства Генрих Риккерт в термин «хаос». Как было показано, этот 
философ обозначал термином «хаос» бесконечное многообразие жизненного 
опыта человека, которое философы должны преобразовывать в «космос» 
теорий. Риккерт полагал, что в процессе познания человек упорядочивает 
хаос. В статье аргументировано, что интерпретация содержания понятия 
«хаос», которую предложил Г. Риккерт, отличается от толкований данного 
термина, которые представлены в произведениях таких немецких философов, 
как И. Кант, И. Гердер, Ф. Шеллинг, Ф. Шлегель, Ф. Ницше. Также было 
показано, что идеи Канта повлияли на формирование представлений 
Риккерта о хаосе. 
 
Ключевые слова 
Риккерт, хаос, формирование понятий, неокантианство, познание, немецкий 
идеализм, эпистемология. 
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